




2 •  2001
Esa Jokivuolle – Karlo Kauko
Financial Markets Department
2.3.2001
The New Basel Accord:
some potential implications of




2 •  2001
Esa Jokivuolle – Karlo Kauko
Financial Markets Department
2.3.2001
The New Basel Accord:
some potential implications of the new standards
for credit risk
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily correspond to the
views of the Bank of Finland or the Financial Supervision.
Esa Jokivuolle, Financial Market Department.








The New Basel Accord:
some potential implications of the new standards
for credit risk
Bank of Finland Discussion Papers 2/2001
Esa Jokivuolle – Karlo Kauko
Financial Markets Department
Abstract
This paper discusses some potential implications – both intended and unintended
– of The New Basel Accord, which is to be finalized by the end of 2001. Our fo-
cus is on the reforms of the rules for determining minimum capital requirements
for credit risk. The discussion is divided into effects at the level of an individual
bank, effects on the structure of the financial markets, and macroeconomic impli-
cations. We present a survey of potential effects rather than a profound analysis of
any of them. Therefore conclusions are inevitably preliminary, and in many cases
they are likely to be controversial. Although the new capital accord as a whole is a
major improvement on many properties of the current framework, our aim is to
find potential problems that might need to be considered in the implementation
and application of the new rules. Overall, the new accord will be largely an ex-
periment, of which many of the consequences remain to be seen.
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Rahoitusmarkkinaosasto
Tiivistelmä
Uusi, luottolaitosten vakavaraisuussääntelyä koskeva kansainvälinen Baselin so-
pimus on tarkoitus viimeistellä vuoden 2001 loppuun mennessä. Tarkastelemme
tässä työssä sopimuksen potentiaalisia vaikutuksia yksittäisiin luottolaitoksiin,
rahoitusmarkkinoiden rakenteeseen sekä makrotalouteen erityisesti luottoriskien
mittausta koskevien uudistusten johdosta. Vaikka uusi sopimus tuo merkittäviä
parannuksia vakavaraisuuden nykyisen sääntelyjärjestelmän ongelmiin, pyrimme
nostamaan esiin seikkoja, joita on ehkä syytä ottaa huomioon uuden sopimuksen
viimeistelyssä ja soveltamisessa. Näkökulman valinnasta johtuen monet johto-
päätökset ovat alustavia ja toisinaan ehkä jopa kiistanalaisia. Kaikkia uuden so-
pimuksen vaikutuksia rahoitusmarkkinoihin on tuskin mahdollista vielä t äysin
ennakoida.
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In different parts of the world governments have imposed capital adequacy re-
quirements on banks. Unlike many other government statutes on banking, these
capital adequacy regulations have been largely harmonised on an international
basis. The famous Basle accord was made in 1988, and it has since then become
an international standard. It has been implemented almost as such in the national
legislation of most countries, including the whole EU, all the major developed
market economies, and a large number of developing and transition economies.
This capital adequcy framework requires that bank’s own funds must equal at
least 8 % of risk-weighted assets and market risks. The method to calculate risk-
weighted assets is rather mechanistic. As to outstanding loans, each receivable is
given a weight that varies between 0 and 100 %, depending on the debtor. To take
a few illustrative examples, commitments by OECD governments are given a 0 %
weight, households’ mortgage loans a 50 % weight and corporate loans a 100 %
weight.
This capital adequacy standard is about to be reformed, mainly because the
original Basel Accord has in many ways become outdated. In particular, it has
become apparent that the current accord is no longer in line with the internal
credit risk measurement systems of the leading banks. The Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision published a consultative paper on the reform in 1999, and a
more concrete proposal for a New Basel Capital Accord in January 2001. The
final version is to be published by the end of 2001. EU has also published its own
consultative documents (1999, 2001) which, however, closely parallel those of
Basel. In the documents the Basel Committee discusses the three ”pillars” of the
new framework. In the first of them, the Committee proposes various ways to
improve the measurement of risks on which minimum capital requirements are
based. The other two pillars concern the upgrading of the supervisory review pro-
cess and the increased use of market discipline as a complement to regulation and
supervision. The proposed reforms would obviously solve many problems of the
current capital framework.
To a large extent the focus in this paper will be on the potential implica-
tions, both intended and unintended, of the increased risk-sensitiveness of the new
rules for credit risk under the minimum capital requirements. Rather than com-
menting on the proposed reforms we take them as given and try to make prelimi-
nary assessments of their effects on issues such as banking stability, structure of
the financial markets and macroeconomic developments.Overall, there are only
limited possibilities of making quantitative assessments of the effects of the new
framework. The relevance of historical data would only be of limited value when
structural regime changes like the one at hand are concerned. It would also take a
considerable number of years after the implementation of the new accord before
much could be said about the overall effects of the reform. What is available now
for making assessments about the future are qualitative judgment and the empiri-
cal results regarding the effects of the 1988 Basel Accord. On the whole, the new
accord will be much of an experiment, many consequences of which remain to be
seen. Nonetheless, further analysis on both theoretical and empirical front should
be called for.8
After a brief review of the proposed new regulatory framework in chapter 2,
the discussion that follows is divided into three sections. These are the impacts of
the reform at the level of a single bank (chapter 3), the impacts on financial mar-
kets (chapter 4) and macroeconomic effects (chapter 5). The paper presents a sur-
vey of potential effects rather than a profound analysis of any of them. Therefore
conclusions are inevitably preliminary, and in many cases they are likely to be
controversial. These are summarized in the final chapter.9
2  The proposals for the new capital adequacy
framework
By now there is a number of sources, in addition to the original consultation docu-
ments, from which one can obtain a good view of the proposed reforms. In this pa-
per we refer the reader to these rather than present a complete review of the propos-
als ourselves
1. Nonetheless, a short recapitulation in the following is in order.
The proposals of the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (1999,
2001) and the European Commission (1999, 2001) are divided into three
”pillars”
2. In addition to these, issues regarding the scope of consolidation are
considered in the new framework, with certain noteworthy differences between
Basel and the EU. The new accord should be finalized by the end of 2001, and its
application should start in the begining of 2004.
Pillar I, our main focus, deals with changes to the current framework of cal-
culating minimum regulatory capital requirements. These include changes to the
treatment of credit risk including credit risk mitigation techniques, such as collat-
eral, as well as the addition of new risk categories such as operational risks. The
overall aim of the reform is to better align banks’ capital with their true risks. The
so called market risks are left intact this time, although there has been some work
on clarifying the borderline between the banking book and the trading book.
The treatment of credit risk is further divided into two alternative approaches:
the standardised approach (SA) and the internal ratings based approach (IRBA). In
the former the aim is to use ratings, provided by external credit assessment institu-
tions, to assign a wider range of risk weights to corporate, bank and sovereign credit
exposures. In the latter, credit institutions’ own internal ratings for their customers,
subject to supervisory approval, would be used for the same purpose. The risk
weights planned under the IRBA exhibit much higher risk-sensitivity than those
under the SA. Moreover, there are two options within the IRBA: the foundation
approach and the advanced approach which relies even more on institutions’ own
estimates for the various risk dimensions of their credit portfolios. On the whole,
the IRBA is expected to be pursued by the more sophisticated institutions and it is
intended to pave the way for the ultimate acceptance of the use of banks’ own credit
risk portfolio models in determining regulatory capital.
Pillar II focuses on improving the supervisory review process. This empha-
sizes that, despite improving the risk-sensitivity of the minimum capital require-
ments, supervisors need to take a comprehensive view on how banks handle their
risk management and internal capital allocation processes. Subject to shortcomings
in these, supervisors could require higher than the minimum capital target from a
given institution. The possibility of such sanctions could also help preclude any
remaining opportunities for capital arbitrage that the new framework might leave.
Pillar III is about increasing credit institutions’ disclosure requirements in order to
enhance the functioning of market discipline (see also Mayes, Halme and Liuksila,
2001). Increasing disclosure requirements may be an important complement to en-
sure the credibility of banks’ internal ratings accepted for use under Pillar I.
                                                
1 See Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (1999, 2001), European Commission (1999),
Karacadag and Taylor (2000a, b) and Standard & Poor’s (1999). Jokivuolle and Launiainen (2000)
contains a review in Finnish. The second round proposals are to come out in early 2001.
2 The second consultative document of the EU is primarily a complement to the Basel document as
regards EU specific issues.10
3  Impacts at the bank-level
The overall aim of better aligning a bank’s capital with its true risks should in
itself improve the stability of the financial sector. Low-risk banks may well do
with less capital than before, whereas high-risk banks have to hold more capital if
they are to maintain their risk positions. There will undoubtedly remain short-
comings even in the new capital rules in that all risks are not accurately measured,
but the improvement on the current system could be quite significant. If this
would happen, the distribution of capital within the financial sector would become
more just after the reform. Nonetheless, at this point it still remains somewhat
unclear what will the effect of the reform be on the overall level of capital in the
system.  In the following we discuss some issues that may affect the final impact
of the more risk-sensitive capital rules on behaviour and stability of individual
banks.
3.1  Effects of new risk-weights on banks’ actual
capital levels
According to Basel (2001) the final calibration of risk-weights in the new frame-
work, along with taking into account the capital charge for operational risks, is
intended to be such that the overall amount of capital in the industry will not be
eroded. Nonetheless, the details of how this calibration will eventually be done are
currently not available. Much may depend on the results of the quantitative impact
study to be carried out in cooperation with the industry (Basel, 2001, Overview:
pp. 9-10)
 3.
While the final calibration determines the amount of capital needed to fulfil
the minimum capital ratio of 8 per cent for a given portfolio, there may be other
factors in the reform that affect the actual amount of capital banks will choose to
hold in excess of the minimum requirement. Since the launch of the 1988 Basle
Accord it has become evident that banks’ actual capital ratios on average exceed
the 8 per cent minimum. Jackson et al. (1999) report that the average capital ratio
among major institutions in G-10 countries rose from 9.3 % in 1988 to 11.2 % in
1996, ie, by about two percentage points. Although other important factors may
have played a role, too, Furfine (2000) argues that the capital regime of 1988 was
a necessary ingredient to explain the observed changes in capital ratios.
Furfine’s (2000) key argument is that banks face considerable costs from
approaching, let alone falling below, the minimum capital requirement. These
might come in the form of intensified supervisory review, weakening reputation,
or immediacy of the need to restore the capital position either by cutting lending
or trying to obtain new external capital. To avoid these costs, banks choose to
hold capital buffers in excess of the minimum requirement. In the New Basel Ac-
                                                
3 To illustrate the potential effect of the new risk-weights based on external ratings, some preli-
minary calculations were done for this paper. Applying the new standardized risk weights on data
of the total long-term U.S. corporate debt per rating class, rated by Moody’s in the period 1987-99,
resulted in on average about a 30 per cent drop in the minimum capital required for this stock of
debt over the sample period. Of course, these type of calculations are quite arbitrary as the aggre-
gate Moody’s data may not at all be representative of relevant bank portfolios. Moreover, no risk
mitigating factors were considered.11
cord the increased risk-sensitivity of the capital charge would apparently increase
the likelihood that,  !, an institution ”hits” the eight per cent mini-
mum ratio some time in the future as ratings, either internal or external, migrate
unexpectedly. This effect would be supposedly stronger in the more risk-sensitive
IRBA. Banks may want to limit this probability by further increasing the capital
cushion above the minimum level. This means that, for a portfolio for which the
new capital rules would leave the minimum capital requirement unchanged, the
bank would hold an actual amount of capital which is higher than under the cur-
rent framework (see also Jokivuolle and Peura, 2001). Banks may also shift their
asset allocation towards less risky assets. Other things equal, these effects would
improve banks’ stability
4. However, in the following section we consider the po-
tential reverse side of the increasing risk sensitivity on banks’ choices.
3.2  Will the internal ratings based systems be
(properly) used?
As the coverage of external ratings in the corporate sector is limited particularly in
Europe, the development of the IRBA has been considered crucial for truly en-
hancing the risk-sensitivity of the new capital accord. Institutions could adopt an
IRBA, subject to supervisory approval, on a voluntary basis, and therefore it is
essential to build sufficient capital incentives in the regulatory framework for
them to do so. Otherwise the effectiveness of the reform, aiming at improving
risk-sensitivity, might remain modest
5. Indeed, the primary hurdle to the use of
the IRBA is that not many banks may yet have sufficiently developed internal
rating systems that would readily fulfil the supervisory minimum requirements
(Karacadag and Taylor, 2000b).Moreover, there is the potential danger that only
those banks who will benefit from the IRBA in the form of lower future capital
requirements will adopt it whereas those who will not will hold to the standard-
ised approach. This sort of ”adverse selection” would imply that the overall
amount of capital in the banking system would decrease.
Basel (2001) refers to a modest average capital relief (2-3 % percent lower
average risk-weighted assets), intended to provide banks with incentives to use the
(foundation) IRBA over banks using the SA. However, as discussed in the previ-
ous section, considering banks’ potential need to hold higher capital buffers over
the minimum to account for the higher volatility of the capital charge in the IRBA
over that in the SA, it is not clear whether the size of the planned capital incentive
will be enough. In other words, the higher risk-sensitivity of the IRBA could also
constitute a hurdle to using it rather than the SA.
Potential problems remain also in the use of the IRBA, which could severily
impair the effectiveness of the framework. These are related to banks’ incentives
to promptly and fully adjust their customers’ ratings downwards as a result of
deteriorating economic conditions, as these adjustments would lead to increases in
                                                
4 It could also be argued that the need to hold ever higher capital cushions to account for the inc-
reased volatility of capital charges would be an argument for supervisors under the supervisory
review process to expect higher actual capital levels than just the minimum requirement (see also
Basel, 2001)
5 Among other incentives to banks to move to the IRBA could be prestige and bringing regulatory
and economic capital calculations closer to one another.12
banks’ capital charges. After all, allowing the use of internal ratings in determin-
ing capital charges is a bit like ”setting the fox to keep the geese”. In particular, to
the extent that judgemental elements in customer ratings are used within the
IRBA, it will be a major challenge to supervisors to oversee that biases of exces-
sive optimism do not enter ratings. Strengthening the supervisory review process
under Pillar II might have a potential role in dealing with these potential pitfalls.
3.3  Effects of increasing informativeness
The aim of the new accord is to strengthen the connection between the reported
solvency ratio and the underlying ”true” financial soundness. If this succeeds, the
official capital adequacy ratio becomes more informative, and different
stakeholders of a typical bank, both from the securities market and the interbank
loan market, would probably pay increasing attention to it. This would probably
affect banks’ funding costs as low-risk banks would be more clearly separated
from high-risk banks.
A counter-argument to the previous reasoning could be that banks have the
possibility to disclose all the relevant information anyway. All the information to
be disclosed under the reformed capital accord could be disclosed under the old
system on a voluntary basis, implying that any rational bank that could benefit
from the disclosure would publish the information. If this is the prevailing situa-
tion, the capital accord reform might make a fairly limited difference to banks’
relative funding costs
6. On the other hand, official solvency ratios calculated ac-
cording to internationally standarised principles would probably affect funding
costs more efficiently than a large amount of information disclosed by banks
themselves in an un-coordinated way. Reliable solvency ratios calculated in a uni-
form way could be used as criteria in decision making almost as such with very
little further analysis, whereas few would-be creditors might be willing to spend
resources on analysing and interpreting large amounts of non-comparable infor-
mation disclosed by different banks. Moreover, as producing information is
costly, small institutions might calculate no solvency ratios unless government
regulations oblige them to do so (see also Hyytinen and Takalo, 2000). In sum-
mary, if the role of the regulatory capital ratios in conveying standardised and
comparable information is valuable to the market in assessing various institutions’
riskiness, then the proposed reform would probably further facilitate the markets’
ability to make these assessments and price bank liabilities more accurately.
Because the relevance of the capital adequacy ratio to banks’ funding costs
may strengthen, some banks might have incentives to alter their official capital
adequacy ratios. Banks might adjust their true risk levels, but even the use of
doubtful methods is possible. For instance, banks might practice window-dressing
by changing the contents of the securities portfolio for the moment of the closing
of the books, or alternatively they might try to utilise remaining possibilities of
capital arbitrage, ie. they could replace certain assets with other assets bearing an
essentially similar risk but belonging to another risk-weight category. The use of
doubtful methods to artificially alter the solvency ratio might have a long-lasting
negative impact on the reputation of the bank, but this might be a minor disincen-
                                                
6 Another reason for why changes in the content of the official capital ratio might not have much
impact on banks’ funding costs is that too wide implicit or explicit safety nets might keep a bank’s
own creditors indifferent as to the real risks of the bank.13
tive if the bank is about to end up in acute and serious financial problems. Thus,
the new capital accord might have opposing effects. The new accord would, 
 ! improve the reliability of solvency ratios as indicators of banks’
financial standing. However, this effect might be partly offset by the possibility
that at least some banks might have more incentives to manipulate the official
solvency ratio.
What way, then, might banks try to manipulate their capital ratios?To take a
simplistic approach, one might state that the capital adequacy ratio is nothing but
an indicator of financial soundness. Because any bank wants to appear creditwor-
thy, banks have incentives to make their capital adequacy ratios appear higher.
This effect may be particularly relevant to a specific sub-group of credit institu-
tions, namely small and medium size banks with a weak deposit base. Obviously,
the cost of market-based funding is no major issue if deposits cover the need for
funding. A high capital adequacy ratio might not impress the creditors of a large
bank with external ratings; most counterparties would still monitor credit ratings
rather than solvency ratios. In the case of small and medium size institutions,
however, the solvency ratio might be one of the best indicators a would-be credi-
tor could observe.
However, a completely different effect might also arise. The so-called sig-
nalling models of corporate debt (See Ross 1977 and Heinkel 1982) predict that
high levels of debt indicate good business prospects. Because managers try to
avoid bankruptcy, they are not willing finance investments by issuing debt unless
future income is likely to cover all the loan servicing costs. Hence, indebtedness is
an indicator of promising business possibilities, and a high level of indebtedness
could increase the aggregate market value of securities issued by the firm, which
is desirable. Maybe it is not entirely unrealistic to hypothetise that this effect
could arise even in the case of banks. If a bank has a capital adequacy ratio far
higher than most competitors, shareholders and creditors might suspect that man-
agers, or possibly even government officials, have decided that the capital ade-
quacy ratio has to be far higher than 8 % because not all the risks are fully re-
flected in the official ratio. Hence, bank credibility might be maximised by an
optimal level of solvency, neither alarmingly close to required minimum, nor ab-
normally high. This might encourage some banks to artificially manipulate their
capital adequacy ratios that could otherwise give the impression of being suspi-
ciously high.
3.4  Effects on group structures
In many cases fully owned subsidiaries operate, 	as units of the parent
company. Nevertheless, the internal ratings system used by the parent company of
a banking group cannot be used by its subsidiaries with the same licence.
A financial group consisting of numerous credit institutions would have to
acquire licenses for multiple internal rating systems. This might be somewhat
costly even if the systems are basically identical. These problems can be particu-
larly commonplace in multinational banking groups because the approval by mul-
tiple supervisors would be required. It may not be obvious that a system licenced
in one country would be automatically approved by the authorities of another
country.
In addition, even if the same rating principles could be used by all the legal
entities, banking laws may not allow free exchange of  information between dif-
ferent legal units. According to the Finnish Banking Act two credit institutions of14
the same group are allowed to exchange customer-specific information. However,
this is no international standard. In certain other jurisdictions banking secrecy
legislation imposes limitations to exchange of customer-specific information be-
tween different legal entities of the same group. Not being allowed to exchange
such information would obviously make it impossible to share a common internal
ratings system.
Using different internal rating systems in different subsidiaries might be
complicated, especially if the different units of the banking group are managed as
a single undertaking. This could be at least a minor incentive for banking groups
to simplify their legal structures and to reduce the number of legal entities. If the
reasons to run the business as multiple legal entities are weak, they might be out-
weighted by relatively unimportant factors.15
4  Impacts on Financial Markets
Many aspects of the capital reform can have potential effects on the structure of
the financial markets. In this section we touch on a few of them including effects
on disintermediation, liquidity of the credit markets and mergers and acquisitions.
Some stability issues are also raised.
4.1  Effects on disintermediation
An important question is whether costs to banks from regulation and supervision
will increase after the introduction of the new framework, and whether these
would speed up the process of disintermediation in the financial sector because of
a negative pressure on banks’ profitability. These could come both as direct costs
of increasing system maintanance and reporting requirements as well as indirect
costs, such as tightening capital requirements for some banks (see, for example,
Diamond and Rajan, 2000a, for the cost of bank capital).
Consider the following indirect cost to banks. As a result of the capital re-
form, it is likely that more and more large and financially sound companies will
acquire external credit ratings in order to get loans at lower interest rates. This
effect will be particularly important if the use of the IRBA remains limited for
some reason (see section 3). Unlike assessments made by banks, external ratings
are public by nature. Therefore, there might be a reduction of asymmetric infor-
mation in the market for corporate credit. According to the modern banking the-
ory, the competitive advantage of banks as lenders is largely based on superior
information. Banks have traditionally made credit assessments themselves. Mak-
ing these assessments has caused monitoring costs, but the acquired information
has been proprietary and provided banks with certain monopoly power. Banks
have been able to maintain wider interest rate margins than what would have been
possible if the information had been freely available. Thus, by encouraging the
use of external ratings, the new capital accord might in certain segments of the
market erode the fundamental source of banks’ competitiveness. Moreover, com-
panies’ possibilities to make banks compete will improve because any would-be
lender can immediately observe the credit-rating with almost no cost. This might
create additional pressures on loan margins. Also, if a debtor company acquires a
credit-rating, it will be easier and faster for it to issue corporate bonds in the mar-
ket whenever it is not satisfied with the offers made by banks. Having this option
at hand might be an additional source of negotiating power, even if it is rarely
used. All these effects seem to contribute to the continuing process of disinterme-
diation.
The proposal for the new capital framework could increase the liquidity of
the market for credit. This could take place both in primary credit contracts, such
as bank loans, as well as in various credit contingent claims, such as credit de-
rivatives and securitisations. Traditionally, bank loans have been ”non-
marketable” assets although more recently, especially in the U.S., the market for
bank loans has grown rapidly (see eg Gorton and Pennacchi, 1995). The problem
of asymmetric information is generally seen as the main reason for the illiquidity
of loans. In the new Basel framework, the supervisory approval of banks’ internal
rating systems in conjunction with enlarged disclosure requirements, as well as
the potentially increasing use of external ratings in the corporate sector, might
facilitate the secondary market for bank loans as information of the risks of these16
contracts becomes better available. As a result, this aspect of the reform might
also contribute to the process of disintermediation in that banks increasingly be-
come mere originators of credit, bearing less of the actual credit risk themselves.
Although improving liquidity is generally seen as a positive thing, the so
called ”paradox of liquidity” should also be considered as a potential threat to
banking stability (Myers and Rajan, 1998). Increasing liquidity of banks’ balance
sheets means that banks can more quickly and with smaller costs change their
asset allocation. This would also make excessive risk taking easier, should the
bank have particular incentives to do so, eg, in financial distress.
As it comes to securitisations, which can be seen as a particular form of
disintermediation, the immediate effect of measuring their risks more accurately
within the new framework could be that the scope for securitisations primarily
aimed at capital arbitrage would be diminished. This is especially so if the Basel
is able to develop a risk-sensitive approach to the implicit guarantees often pro-
vided by the issuing bank. On the other hand, other aspects of the new capital
framework suggest that the productive use of securitisations could increase. In
particular, the proposal to include a treatment for the degree of diversification
within the IRBA could encourage the use of securitisations and credit derivatives
in achieving better diversification and, hence, a lower capital charge. Nonetheless,
problems with the use of credit derivatives, in particular, do remain (The Econo-
mist, 2001). The recognition of the risk-reducing effect of diversification could
also give a further spur to the market for syndicated loans.
4.2  Mergers and acquisitions
As the minimum standards for an IRB system would probably be made rather
strict, the IRBA might primarily be available for rather advanced institutions.
Furthermore, as the fixed costs of establishing an IRB system could be quite high,
it might only make sense for sufficiently large institutions to invest in one. These
factors would further encourage mergers and acquisitions already taking place in
the financial sector, if especially small and medium size banks found it beneficial
to start using the IRBA. This could be the case if the average capital relief in the
IRBA over the SA were significant enough. Another thing that could directly
contribute to further consolidation in the banking sector is the new proposal’s rec-
ognition of credit portfolio diversification in determining the capital requirement.
Mergers and acquisitions would be a natural way of reaping the capital benefits
from better diversification. The likely acceptance of full-blown credit portfolio
models in the future, which, unlike the current proposal, also incorporate sectoral
and geographical diversification, would further give a spur to cross-border con-
solidation. From the stability point of view these developments might not be un-
ambiguously positive as ”too-big-to-fail” problems could accumulate.17
4.3  Effects on the location of financial institutions
One of the ideas in the proposal is that banking counterparties could have differ-
ent risk weights depen-ding on their home countries’ ratings.
7 The credit-rating of
the central government would be used as an indicator of the soundness of the
banks incorporated within its jurisdiction. It is proposed that counter-party banks
would be given risk weighs one category less favourable than that applied to the
sovereign. Thus, banks incorporated in countries being rated AA- or higher (Stan-
dard & Poor’s) should be given a 20 % risk weight, whereas banks located in less
creditworthy countries would have less favourable weights. There are strong ar-
guments in favour of  this proposal, because the credit-rating of the govern-ment
certainly reflects the standing of the whole national economy.
Under this system banks would prefer money market counterparties domi-
cilied in highly rated countries, which might reduce the costs of funding of insti-
tutions incorporated in such countries relative to banks located in less creditwor-
thy countries. Interestingly, being located in a highly rated country is a competi-
tive advantage that can be acquired. International capital movements have been
liberalised to a very large extent, and there are few regulations that would oblige
shareholders to register their company in any par-ticular jurisdiction. In interna-
tional financial groups interbank operations might be centralised in units in-
corporated in creditworthy countries because this could enable the group to ac-
quire funding at a mar-ginally lower cost. In some cases such units might even be
established for that purpose, especially if the group already has branches in the
highly rated country.
In some cases even countries that would fall within the 20 % risk weight
category might be disregarded as legal domiciles because of the risk of down-
grading. An AAA rated country would be a better location than an AA- rated
country, because the latter is more likely to be downgraded to a category that
would no longer qualify for the lowest risk weight.
However, EU banks shall treat the whole union as the home market, and for
them the home country of an EU counterparty would be irrelevant to the risk
weight. Banks domicilied outside the EU, instead, would proably apply country-
specific risk weights to EU banks. This disparity  might be of limited importance
because EU countries’ credit ratings are rather homogenous. At the moment,
Greece is the only EU country with an S&P rating below AA-. On the other hand,
the next round of EU enlargement is likely to change this situation.  Three future
members would not fall within the highest risk weight category, at least not with
their current ratings.
8 Banks located in other EU countries would have some com-
petitive advantage over non-EU banks in interbank lending to banks in these new
EU entrants. This might en-courage some banks in AAA rated member countries
to accumulate excessive country risk concentrations in the interbank markets of
certain new member countries.
To take a fictious extreme example, a bank incorporated in, say, Luxem-
bourg might specialise in taking loans from Japanese credit institutions and for-
warding this funding to banks domicilied in new member states. Both the Japa-
nese bank and its Luxembourgian counterparty would have in their books loans in
the best interbank category. The amount of regulatory banking capital needed for
                                                
7 The second option is to use the rating of the counterparty bank itself.
8 The Estonian S & P rating is A-, the Polish rating A+ and the Hungarian rating A.18
intermediating one unit of money from Japanese savers to debtor banks in new
member states would equal (0.2*0.08) = 0.016 per bank, and 0.032 in total.  If the
Japanese bank lent directly to the same debtor banks, these loans would fall within
the category of 50  % weighting, and the intermediation would require
(0.5*0.08) = 0.04 units of banking capital. Thus, the banking industry utilizes its
regulatory capital in a more efficient way if the funding is intermediated through
Luxembourg.
4.4  Other aspects
There may be some potential problems with designing the new capital framework,
particularly the IRBA, to be fully compatible with certain special features of
banking that serve important functions in the economy
9. If such incompatibilities
are built in, banks may face disincentives to carry on with certain activities to the
extent that would be socially optimal.
An example of such a problem could be the incorporation of a measure of
loan portfolio diversification in the IRBA, already discussed in the previous sub-
section. The idea is that the more diversified a bank’s portfolio is in terms of the
size distribution of single exposures, the lower capital charge it should incur, other
things being equal. However, a certain amount of concentration in a loan portfolio
might be needed to provide banks with sufficient incentives to monitor and screen
their customers
10. Encouraging banks away from all sorts of customer concentra-
tions by offering them lower capital charges might lead banks to adopt such levels
of customer screening and monitoring that could be suboptimal from the overall
stability point of view. The same problem concerns the use of credit risk miti-
gants, such as credit derivatives and securitizations, that both can be seen as ef-
fectively reducing the bank’s interest in customers involved in the underlying
credit contracts.
As a result of the incentives to develop IRB systems as well as to enhance
the overall risk measurement and management capabilities of credit institutions,
as implied by Pillar II, there would be a still growing market for commercial pro-
viders of credit risk technologies and data. For many years to come, the use of
commercially provided data and methods for developing IRB systems might be
necessitated by the insufficient amount of internal data currently available in
many institutions within the banking sector. The pitfall of this development could
be that banks start relying too heavily on these commercially provided methods at
the cost of neglecting the maintanance and development of their traditional inter-
nal risk management culture. Of course, this may be one of the concerns regula-
tors can tackle in the supervisory review process under Pillar II.
                                                
9 Indeed, even the very requirement for minimum capital can have perverse effects as regards its
intended aim of increasing bank stability; see Diamond and Rajan (2000).
10 See Winton (1999).19
5  Macro-Level Impacts
More risk-sensitive capital requirements are designed to enhance banking stability
which in principle should also stabilize economic fluctuations. Risk-sensitive
capital requirements could be seen as a way of containing the excessive risk-
taking incentives (moral hazard) that highly leveraged institutions, such as banks,
may have. At the extreme a bank may have an incentive to accept financing proj-
ects with even negative net present values as far as the upside return potential of
the projects is large enough. To mitigate these harmful effects, more risk-sensitive
capital rules could help restrain financial institutions from financing investment
projects with bad risk-return ratios. As a result, the corporate sector, and therefore
credit institutions themselves, would be in a stronger position to face negative
external shocks. Secondly, more risk-sensitive capital requirements would spur
banks and their customers alike to promptly resolve problems. This could further
enhance efficiency and stability in the long-run. As regards this second point, the
supervisory experience also suggests that rather than lowering the capital re-
quirement on troubled institutions it is better to insist on fast resolution of prob-
lems, and require prompt restoration of capital, as weakly capitalized institutions
in particular may have increased incentives for excessive risk-taking
11.
Nonetheless, there is also a well-known argument that bank capital ade-
quacy requirements may exacerbate business fluctuations (Blum and Hellwig,
1995). This is because after a, say, negative aggregate demand shock banks have
to adjust to the accumulating loan losses and the resulting decline in their capital
by cutting lending. This would further strengthen the impact of the initial shock
on the economy. Moreover, it has been suggested that this effect is stronger if
”mark-to-market” accounting rules are applied (Hellwig, 1995). More risk-
sensitive capital requirements would effectively work in the same way as such
accounting rules, so the proposed capital reform could further exacerbate business
cycles. Empirical research which has studied the impact of the 1988 Basel Accord
has found some support for these views, although it appears hard to disentangle
this particular effect from other potential effects
12. Some authors have asked
whether the very design of the prudential regulatory regimes should account for
the macro level effects (see White, 1999 and 2000).
Banks could of course anticipate these effects by raising their initial capital
ratios to such levels that the decline in capital as a result of an exogenous shock is
unlikely to necessitate restrictions in banks’ own lending policies. However, the
resulting higher average bank capital ratios would imply less financial interme-
diation, which could have adverse implications for long-run economic growth
13.
Recently, the use of the so called dynamic provisioning in helping to smooth
the pro-cyclical elements of capital regulation has been much discussed. Some
countries have even proceeded to develop their regulatory practices in this direc-
tion. Although the goal of these efforts may be well justified, the argumentation
so far has been somewhat unclear. To smooth lending cycles, loss reserves should
apparently be relatively high when times are good and relatively low when times
are bad. The problem is to identify when times are exceptionally good to justify
                                                
11 The U.S. savings and loan crisis appears to be a case in point.
12 See Jackson et. al. (1999). A recent paper by Furfine (2000) argues that the 1988 Capital Accord
did cause a credit crunch.
13 See Diamond and Rajan (2000a) for a discussion on the optimal level of bank capital.20
higher reserve requirements. Much of it boils down to the question of how well
economic fluctuations can be forecast; ie, what is the size of transitory compo-
nents in the aggregate growth. Moreover, it is unclear why the same smoothing
could not be achieved with capital regulation. In economic sense, there’s really no
difference between loss reserves and capital. So, in essence we are back to the
question of White (1999, 2000) and others of whether prudential regulation in the
first place should try to smooth the macro level fluctuations.
Improving risk-sensitivity of the capital requirements against credit risk may
also have consequences that have their analog in the area of market risks. It has
been recently argued that leading financial institutions’ wide use of risk measure-
ment models, the so-called Value-at-Risk models, which all share essentially the
same properties, and acting on the signals generated by these models, may actu-
ally have increased market volatility, and perhaps contagion effects, especially in
times of market disturbances. The use of external ratings, in particular, in the new
capital adequacy framework could have similar effects as institutions would si-
multaneously have to adjust to increased capital requirements after (correlated)
rating downgrades. As many institutions would be selling off their liquid risky
assets at the same time, this could further amplify the price effects on these assets
in the market. Through the reduced collateral value of these assets this process
could further feed into reduced lending and, therefore, amplify the initial eco-
nomic shock.
On balance, more risk-sensitive capital requirements appear to have oppo-
site effects on economic fluctuations. Further research would be most welcome to
help better assess the sign of the net impact.
The issue of macroeconomic effects of the new capital framework discussed
here is also relevant in the international context. Concerns have been raised that
the more risk-sensitive capital requirements would further destabilize the interna-
tional capital flows. While there could be such a danger in the short-term, more
risk-sensitivity of the capital accord could also give financial institutions, corpo-
rates and governments incentives to deal quickly with problems in order to restore
their creditworthiness. In the long-run, this could actually help stabilize capital
flows
14.
                                                
14 Diamond and Rajan (2000b) point out that it is important to correctly distinguish between causes
and symptoms when dealing with the problems of international finance.21
6  Conclusions
This paper has discussed some potential effects of the proposed new capital adequacy
framework, ie, the New Basel Accord. The focus has been on the reform of the rules
regarding credit risk under the so called Pillar I. When possible, we have tried to as-
sess the effects from the viewpoint of banking sector stability. The main points raised
are as follows:
It is not clear how effective will, in particular, the internal ratings based system
(IRBA) be in enhancing the overall risk-sensitivity of the capital framework. First, as
based on voluntariness, will the incentives for banks to adopt the approach be high
enough? Secondly, can it be ensured that, once within the IRBA, banks promptly and
fully adjust their internal ratings also to deteriorating economic conditions of their
customers, given that this would imply higher capital charges to them?
More risk-sensitive capital rules will imply more unexpected variation over
time in banks’ capital charges. Banks might have to adjust to this by further increas-
ing their capital cushions above the minimum capital requirement. On the other hand,
the need for higher capital cushions could further increase the hurdle to move to the
IRBA.
The reform would probably improve the  reliability of regulatory capital ratios
as indicators of financial soundness. Therefore banks’ own creditors would be likely
to pay increasing attention to this source of information. Thus, the solvency ratio
could affect banks’ funding costs. This might encourage banks to utilize remaining
possibilities to artificially manipulate the official solvency ratio.
The new framework could speed up the process of disintermediation as banks’
direct and indirect costs from regulation and supervision could increase.
The potentially increasing use of external ratings within the corporate sector
might reduce banks’ possibilities to charge implicit monitoring fees, such as interest
rate spreads. Competition in the corporate loan market would then intensify rather
than slacken. This could also contribute to the process of disintermediation.
As regards structural changes in financial markets, at least some effects on
mergers and acquisitions, markets for risk mitigating products, and the overall liquid-
ity of credit markets can be expected. For example, the number of mergers and acqui-
sitions could further increase, especially among small and medium size institutions, in
an attempt to economize on internal risk measurement costs as well as in reaping the
benefits of better credit portfolio diversification. If the domicile of a banking counter-
party affects its risk weight, multinational banking groups may have incentives to
centralize their interbank borrowing in units registered in highly rated countries.
Certain features of the IRBA might not be fully consistent with the role of
banks in the economy. For instance, rewarding diversification of the loan portfolio by
a lower capital charge might, after certain point, weaken banks’ incentives to engage
in screening and monitoring their customers, which might in the long run have ad-
verse stability effects. The same problem appears also in the context of risk mitigation
techniques, such as credit derivatives and securitization, that effectively reduce the
credit originator’s interest in the credit customer.
An argument goes that more risk-sensitive capital requirements would further
amplify business cycles. On the other hand, as more risk-sensitive capital require-
ments would be better in line with the true risks of banks, the ex ante allocational
efficiency should be improved, and thereby the economy might be better prepared to
encounter negative exogenous shocks. The net impact of these opposing forces is not
clear and, hence, their eventual effect on stability largely remains an open question.22
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